In 2011, Ingmar Riedel‐Kruse's bioengineering laboratory at Stanford University publicized an application that uses paramecia for what the researchers termed “biotic games.” These games make use of living organisms, computer programs, and lab equipment to implement games like Pong, Pac‐man, and soccer. Gamesand related activities are often considered nonserious or trivial, whereas life, biological systems, and science are treated very seriously in moral analysis and public perception. The manipulation of living matter frequently engenders at least some controversy in the (...) marketplace of ideas, and using living things in games is no exception. Some of the objections lodged against biotic games have appeared in the ethics literature on similar topics; however, the addition of an entertainment element introduces some objections distinct from those about similar cases, as the online comments vividly illustrate. We aim to explore and address the objections in this paper, using the comments to organize and launch the discussion. In scientific work, there is typically a presumption of some prospect of translation and application of generated knowledge for public benefit. In the case of biotic games, these applications are not self‐evident. Because of this, a serious analysis of the justifications, limitations, and features of biotic games is warranted. To this end, we outline key ethical limits that ought to be placed on these activities as well as the obligations that these activities generate for researchers, other professionals, and lay people who design, implement, use, and play them. (shrink)

In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...) and therapy should make humans in the biological sense more human in the moral sense, even if they cease to be human in the biological sense. This serves valuable biomedical ends like the promotion of health and well-being, for if humans do not become more moral, civilization is threatened. It is unimportant that humans remain biologically human, since they do not have moral value in virtue of belonging to H. sapiens. (shrink)

What role does the wild duck play in Ibsen's famous drama? I argue that, besides mirroring the fate of the human cast members, the duck is acting as animal subject in a quasi-experiment, conducted in a private setting. Analysed from this perspective, the play allows us to discern the epistemological and ethical dimensions of the new scientific animal practice (systematic observation of animal behaviour under artificial conditions) emerging precesely at that time. Ibsen's play stages the clash between a scientific and (...) a romantic understanding of animals that still constitutes the backdrop of most contemporary debates over animals in research. Whereas the scientific understanding reduces the animal's behaviour, as well as its environment, to discrete and modifiable elements, the romantic view regards animals as being at one with (or violently disconnected from) their natural surroundings. (shrink)

Speeches of the author on theory of knowledge in the context of Islamic philosophy.

Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

On Sikh doctrines inunciated by Guru Nanak.

In this paper, I will reread the history of molecular genetics from a psychoanalytical angle, analysing it as a case history. Building on the developmental theories of Freud and his followers, I will distinguish four stages, namely: (1) oedipal childhood, notably the epoch of model building (1943–1953); (2) the latency period, with a focus on the development of basic skills (1953–1989); (3) adolescence, exemplified by the Human Genome Project, with its fierce conflicts, great expectations and grandiose claims (1989–2003) and (4) (...) adulthood (2003–present) during which revolutionary research areas such as molecular biology and genomics have achieved a certain level of normalcy—have evolved into a normal science. I will indicate how a psychoanalytical assessment conducted in this manner may help us to interpret and address some of the key normative issues that have been raised with regard to molecular genetics over the years, such as ‘relevance’, ‘responsible innovation’ and ‘promise management’. (shrink)

A promise to do some action seems to create a binding obligation to do that action. And yet, paradoxically, an obligation seems not to be a fact that we can create or bring into existence; we can create an obligation only by creating or bringing into existence something else. The only way to avoid the paradox is to show that the act of promising creates something other than an obligation, which nonetheless binds us to perform the action in question. After (...) considering and rejecting various options such as the promisee's expectation and the promisor's resolve, Prichard locates the bindingness of a promise in a prior general promise, which allows the noises we make when promising to generate an obligation to perform the promised action. (shrink)

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. ECMO是一項高風險、高創傷、高消耗的創新技術，它能夠為新冠病毒肺炎重症患者提供挽救性治療°ECMO的治療目標是幫助患者恢復心肺功能，或者橋接最終治療，包括器械植入，或者器官移植等。然而，容易被忽視的 事實是，ECMO挽救了一些患者的生命，但也可能讓那些沒有康復機會的患者陷入醫療困境。於是，ECMO的臨床應用不得不面對一些反對意見，包括嚴重併發症危害患者生命安全、無效治療導致技術失敗，以及大量佔用資 源損害醫療公平等。ECMO技術的臨床應用應該在尊重生命價值和患者意願的基礎上，合理設置治療目標、確立可接受退出標準、妥善處理患者意願與ECMO設備撤除困境之間的倫理衝突，建立適度倫理框架以合理控制醫療 干預的邊界。 Characterized by high risk, high trauma and high consumption, Extra-Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO) is an innovative technology that can be used as salvage therapy for COVID-19 patients. ECMO treatment can help restore patients' cardiopulmonary function or can bridge their final treatment, including device implantation or organ transplantation. However, although ECMO saves some patients' lives, it can also leave those with no chance of recovery in a medical dilemma. ECMO (...) is thus controversial: it is criticized for technical failures and ineffective treatments, and its use raises questions about medical equity. This paper argues that the clinical application of ECMO technology should be based on a respect for the value of life and the will of patients, reasonably set therapeutic goals, acceptable withdrawal criteria, proper management of the conflict between patients' desires and the medical dilemma, and the establishment of an ethical framework to control the limits of medical intervention. (shrink)

This paper studies in detail about the early years of José Gaos (1900- 1969) and his education in philosophy and literature. Therefore, we know that their studies (academic or not) were not purely “philosophical” in 1915. Literature and philosophy played in Gaos an equally important role. The first real encounter with philosophy happens before he comes to Valencia in 1915; but in this year Gaos also receives a strong education, in aesthetic and literary, through press and philosophical journals, and especially (...) within the group formed with Max Aub, José Medina Echeverría and his brother Carlos Gaos. (shrink)

To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he observes that causing a change is not (...) itself an activity. In moving one's hand, one performs that indefinable mental activity of willing some change. The movement of the hand is the effect of the action, not the action itself, a fact overlooked by thinkers like Locke. Turning to the nature of the desire behind one's willing, Prichard rejects the view that this desire is actually a desire for the change willed. Despite forceful objections, Prichard maintains that this desire is the desire for the willing of that change. (shrink)

To the question ‘What is the basis of moral obligation?’, argues that there is no general answer. It is improper to imply that all right acts are right for the same reason. Before defending this view, considers two possible grounds for moral obligation: 1) the goodness of the effects of an action, and 2) the goodness of the act itself. Whereas the former, which is broadly utilitarian, fails to comply with our real moral convictions, the latter does not capture well (...) the role that motive plays in determining the rightness of an action. Moral principles are not deducible either from one single principle or from anything that is not a principle. Each is independent and possesses its own reason as the basis for a given moral obligation. (shrink)

This essay argues that schooling in Israel is tied too closely to ideology. This results in an indoctrinary orientation that contributes to divisiveness and imperils Israeli democracy. After reviewing and critiquing the roots of this orientation, I advance an alternative that understands education as an agent of the good rather than ideology. Israeli schooling requires a vision of goodness broad enough to encompass competing conceptions of Jewish life espoused by the majority as well as non-Jewish orientations affirmed by various minorities. (...) Such a vision can be grounded, I contend, in a democratic Jewish theology that emphasizes God as teacher rather than tyrant. (shrink)

Estudio sobre el alcance de la concepción del pensamiento hispanoamericano en José Gaos, en su obra de los años 40. A History of Latin American Philosophy (s. XVI- XIX): / José Gaos (1900-1969).

Estudio sobre diferentes aspectos, desde la E. Moderna a la Contemporánea, en el pensamiento de J. Gaos en sus textos de los años 40.

Prichard's concern here is whether a person's obligation depends either on features of his or her situation or on features of his or her thoughts about that situation. Related to this contrast between the objective view and the subjective view is the issue of whether an obligation is an obligation to do some action. To the latter issue, Prichard responds that an obligation is not an obligation to do something, but an obligation to set ourselves to do something; as a (...) consequence, it is necessary to modify the terms of Prichard's primary concern. This modification diminishes the force of the objective view and does nothing to eliminate the central difficulty in the subjective view, namely, that the obligation to do some action is said to depend not on the character that the action would have, but on our belief that it would have that character. The belief that some general character picks out obligations derives from the mistaken habit of regarding the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as equivalent to ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’. Having highlighted this mistake, Prichard holds that in instances where we have considered the circumstances fully, our thoughts about the situation decide whether we ought to perform a given activity. (shrink)

This new edition of Introduction to Lattices and Order presents a radical reorganization and updating, though its primary aim is unchanged. The explosive development of theoretical computer science in recent years has, in particular, influenced the book's evolution: a fresh treatment of fixpoints testifies to this and Galois connections now feature prominently. An early presentation of concept analysis gives both a concrete foundation for the subsequent theory of complete lattices and a glimpse of a methodology for data analysis that is (...) of commercial value in social science. Classroom experience has led to numerous pedagogical improvements and many new exercises have been added. As before, exposure to elementary abstract algebra and the notation of set theory are the only prerequisites, making the book suitable for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students. It will also be a valuable resource for anyone who meets ordered structures. (shrink)

Maintaining that the existence of Moral Philosophy, as it is usually understood, rests on a mistake, Prichard undertakes to formulate our true attitude towards moral obligations. The right action does not depend upon either our own good or what is good. Obligations are underivative, immediate, and self‐evident, and therefore, we do not come to appreciate them through argument or a process of non‐moral thinking. The mistake on which Moral Philosophy rests, which links obligation to virtue or desire, parallels the mistake (...) underpinning the Theory of Knowledge. Like moral obligation, knowledge is immediate; it need not be vindicated or improved by additional knowledge. (shrink)

We investigate the notion of minimal cognition, and claim that this notion already applies to bacterial behavior. On the basis of the example of E. coli, we argue that the basis of cognition can be profitably cast as sensorimotor coordinations which subserve the metabolic requirements of organisms.

The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action, then he or she will do that action. In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves (...) thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action. (shrink)